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I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
Petitioner-Appellant Timothy Williams appeals the District Court's Memorandum Decision,

Order and Appellate Judgment filed on July 1, 2013. The Memorandum Decision, Order and
Appellate Judgment was issued after briefing and argument on Appellant's Petition for Judicial
Review, which petition appealed the Final Order of the Respondent-Cross-Appellant Idaho State
Board of Real Estate Appraisers (hereinafter the "Board"), dated February 27,2012. The Final Order
found that Williams committed four (4) violations of the law and rules governing real estate
appraisers in Idaho. The Final Order accordingly revoked Williams' real estate appraiser license,
imposed a fine in the amount of $4,000, and ordered Williams to pay the Board's costs and attorney
fees accrued in the investigation and prosecution of the four violations found by the Board.

B.

Procedural and Factual History.
Respondent refers to and incorporates by reference the Procedural Background in the District

Court's Memorandum Decision, Order and Appellate Judgment for the factual and procedural
history of this case. (R., pp. 565-567.)

U.
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A.

Issue Presented on Cross-Appeal.
I.

The District Court erred in determining that the Board's express authority to recover

costs and fees was too vague to allow the Board to recover attorney fees it incurred in investigating
and prosecuting Williams' four violations of its laws.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 1.

B.

Additional Issues Presented on Appeal.
1.

Petitioner improperly raises for the first time on appeal a void for vagueness challenge

to I.C § 54-4107 (1)( c) and (e) to this Court and, therefore, the issue is precluded from consideration
on appeal.

2.

Petitioner improperly reasserts challenges to the statutory bases for some of the

findings against him for violation of I.C § 54-4107 (1 )(d) and (e) because his assertions were raised
for the first time on appeal to the District Court.

III.
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
The Board is entitled to an award of its fees and costs on appeal pursuant to I.C § 12-117.
The Board is a state agency within the meaning of I.C § 12-117 and is therefore entitled to an award
of its fees and costs on the basis that Petitioner-Appellant has appealed the findings of the Board in
its Final Order without a reasonable basis in fact or law in whole or, in the alternative, in part.
Petitioner has contested the Board's Final Order for reasons that were largely considered and rejected
by the Hearing Officer, and there is plainly substantial and competent evidence supporting the
Board's findings in its Final Order.

IV.
ARGUMENT
A.

Standard of Review on .Iudicial Review.
Proceedings before the Board and judicial review of the actions of the Board are governed

by chapter 52, title 67 of the Idaho Code, otherwise known as the Idaho Administrative Procedures
Act. I.C §§ 54-2305(f), 67-5207. A strong presumption of validity favors an agency's actions.

Cooperv. Board of Prof I Discipline of the Idaho State Bd. ofMedicine , 134 Idaho 449, 454 (2000).
The agency's action may only be set aside if the agency's findings, conclusions, or decisions

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 2.

(a) violate constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) exceed the agency's statutory authority; (c) are
made upon unlawful procedure; (d) are not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a
"""hole; or (e) are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. I.e. § 67-5279(3). The petitioner
bears the burden of showing that the board erred in one of the enumerated manners. Price v. Payette

Cty. Board ofCty. Commissioners, 131 Idaho 426, 429 (1998). In addition, the court will affirm an
agency action unless a substantial right of the appellant has been prejudiced. I.e. § 67-5279(4).
Judicial review is confined to the record. Jefferson County v. Eastern Idaho Reg. Med. Ctr.,
126 Idaho 392, 394 (eL App. 1994) (citing I.e.§§ 67-5277, -5279(1). The court will defer to the
agency's findings of fact unless those findings are clearly erroneous and unsupported by evidence
in the record. Cooper, 134 Idaho at 454, The court may not substitute its judgment for that of the
agency as to the weight of the evidence on factual matters. Id. Factual determinations by
administrative agencies should be overturned only upon a showing of a clearly erroneous decision
or an abuse of discretion. Jefferson County, 126 Idaho at 394 (citing I.e. § 67-5279(3)(d), (3). If
the order is not affirmed, it shall be set aside in whole or in part and the case remanded. I.e. § 675279(3)(e).

B.

There Was No Violation of Idaho Law in the Complaints Filed Requiring a Dismissal
of the Charges.
Williams claims that there was a failure to follow the Idaho statutes governing complaints

against a licensee in the procedures of this case.

Specifically, Williams contends that the

investigation into Williams' actions were initiated upon unlawful procedure because Williams claims
there was no written, sworn complaint or formal motion made at a hearing by the Board to begin the

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 3.

investigation as Williams argues was required by I.e. § 54-4107 (1). 1 Yet as he notes in his briefing,
this issue was raised several times before two separate hearing officers during the pendency of this
proceeding (see Petitioner's Brief, p. 18), and each time the hearing officer ruled in favor of the
Board on the matter. More so, Williams raised this same issue twice on judicial review, and twice
the District Court also ruled in favor of the Board. First the District Court, Judge McKee presiding,
ruled in favor of the Board, finding no procedural error. See Williams v. State of Idaho Bd. of Real

Estate Appraisers, Decision and Order on Appeal, CV-OC-0822331, May 21, 2009. Second, the
District Court, Judge Sticklen presiding, again ruled in favor of the Board on this issue. (See R., pp.
569-572.) This Court should likewise decline to find for Petitioner on this issue.

1.

Pursuant to its Statutory Authority, the Idaho Board of Real Estate Appraisers
Entered into a Lawful Agreement with the Bureau of Occupational Licenses,
Granting Authority to Initiate Investigations Without a Formal Motion of the
Board.

The Idaho Board of Real Estate Appraisers is a part of the Department of Self Governing
Agencies. I.e. § 67-2601 (2)(b). Additionally, the Bureau of Occupational Licenses was created
within the department of self-governing agencies. I.e. § 67-2601(3). State law provides that "the
bureau of occupational licenses created in the department of self-governing agencies by Section 672601, Idaho Code, shall be empowered, by written agreement between the bureau and each agency
for which it provides administrative or other services as provided by law, to provide such services
for the ... real estate appraiser board." (Emphasis added.) I.e. § 67-2602(1).
The Idaho Real Estate Appraiser's Act is found at Chapter 41, Title 54, of the Idaho Code.
The Act provides that, "the board shall have, in addition to the powers conferred elsewhere in this

lThis statute was amended in 2008 to remove this requirement.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF· 4.

chapter, the following powers and duties: (a) To authorize, by written agreement, the bureau of
occupational licenses to act as its agent in its interest; ... (c) To conduct investigations into
violations of the provisions of this chapter." (Emphasis added.) I.e. § 54-4106(2).
Pursuant to its statutory authority, the Idaho State Real Estate Appraiser Board entered into
the "Agreement for Services Between the Idaho State Real Estate Appraiser Board and the Bureau
of Occupational Licenses" ("Agreement") on July 1,2004. (R. Agency, Vol. I, Tab No. 25, p. 1.)
On July 1, 2007, the Board ratified the "Renewal Addendum of Agreement for Services Between
the Idaho State Real Estate Appraiser Board and the Idaho Bureau of Occupational Licenses." Id.
The Agreement can be found attached as Exhibit "A" to the Aff. of Budd Hetrick. R. Agency, Vol.
I, Tab No. 25. The Agreement provides in pertinent part:

14.
COMPLAINTS
As described in EXHIBIT A, the IBOL shall receive complaints against licensees and
acknowledge receipt of complaints in writing on behalf of the Board. The IBOL shall
review complaints to determine if the complaint falls within the Board's regulatory
authority and shall refer those that are within that authority for investigation by the
IBOL. .. .The IBOL shall conduct investigations of complaints within the Board's
authority ... .The IBOL shall report the results of investigations to the Board or its
designee to determine if further action is appropriate. The IBOL shall notify the
complaining party of the IBOL's action and the basis for the action.
The IBOL shall conduct investigations of complaints within the Board's authority ...
the IBOL shall report the results of investigations to the Board or its designee to
determine if further action is appropriate. The IBOL shall take such actions as the
Board may direct and report that action to the complainant.

R. Agency, Vol. 1, Tab No. 25, Exh. "A," Agreement For Services Between the Idaho State Real
Estate Appraiser Board and the Bureau of Occupational Licenses, <j[ 14, p. 7.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 5.

The Agreement, further provides in pertinent part:

EXHIBIT A
IBOL COMPLAINT POLICY AND PROCEDURE
The IBOL has a policy of operating from written and signed complaints. Persons
attempting to submit verbal or 3rd party complaints shall be advised that all
complaints must be in writing and signed by the complainant before the IBOL shall
consider them." (Emphasis added.)
The IBOL performs an initial brief review of all new complaints to insure that
adequate information has been submitted and that jurisdiction exists. If additional
information is necessary, a letter of request is sent to the complainant. If the
complaint is determined to be outside the jurisdiction of the board, the complainant
is notified of that fact, as well as other avenues that may be pursued. The complaint
may also be referred to another governmental entity for consideration.
If further action on a complaint is warranted, subsequent to review, the original
complaint document shall be assigned a complaint number by the IBOL. The IBOL
prepares both a master file and an investigative file, and registers the complaint
number in the complaint log. The complaint is then assigned to the investigative unit
for such investigation as may be necessary to discover evidence as to whether or not
a violation of the applicable regulations has occurred. The master files are kept in
the lBOL office. The master file for each complaint will ultimately consist of the
original complaint, investigative documents, evidence, and correspondence received
during the course of investigation. The complainant shall be provided written
notification that an investigation will take place and notice of the results of the
investigation or subsequent action when the process is complete.
The IBOL will conduct a review of all new and existing complaints on a regular
basis. Each complaint will be reviewed to monitor the current status of the
complaint, to receive investigative progress reports, and to determine any appropriate
action that may be necessary. The complaint may be referred to a technical advisor
for input at any time during the process. The technical advisors chosen from names
recommended by the Board or from other licensees as may be necessary to provide
expert opinions concerning professional ethics, scopes of practice, and other
evaluations of professional procedure as may be necessary. If a Board member
serves as a technical advisor for a particular investigation, the IBOL will recommend
that the member be recused from any subsequent board action concerning the matter.
Once the investigation is deemed complete and adequate, the IBOL will either make
a recommendation to the Board regarding possible action or refer the investigation
to a deputy from the Office of the Attorney General for review. The Deputy Attorney
General CDAG") will serve as prosecuting attorney and will review the investigation
to determine if some form of legal action would be appropriate to address the issues
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in the complaint. The DAG will present a "blind" review of the investigation to the
Board, together with a recommendation of possible action. The Board shall provide
such direction and recommendations as may be necessary to allow mOL or the DAG
to pursue the resolution of complaints. Such final resolution may include closure
without action or any other action up to and including license revocation. The Board,
the mOL, or the DAG may refer complaints to other appropriate city, county, or
Federal authorities for further review or action.
The Board shall be notified prior to any final action on a complaint under the Board's
jurisdiction. While Formal Complaints may be initially approved by the mOL, all
final determinations regarding Formal Complaints shall only be made subsequent to
the approval of the Board. Consent agreements may be negotiated between the DAG
prior to presentation to the Board, but the final decision making authority shall
always rest with the Board. The Board must formally accept all consent agreements,
final orders, and other disciplinary actions before they shall be considered valid.
Original complaints and other materials submitted to or obtained by the mOL, during
the course of investigation or otherwise, and the subsequent action regarding original
complaints shall not be a public record and shall not be disclosed. Formal
disciplinary action including consent orders, stipulated agreements, formal
complaints and any resulting sanction, restriction, advisory, reprimand, and condition
adopted by the Board shall be a public record and subject to public disclosure.
R. Agency, Vol. I, Tab No. 25, Exh. "A," Agreement For Services Between the Idaho State Real
Estate Appraiser Board and the Bureau of Occupational Licenses, Exh. "A," IBOL Complaint
Policy and Procedure, p. 17.
The above discussion explains the Board's statutory authority to enter into the 2004
Agreement with mOL. Under this Agreement, the Board clearly grants mOL the authority to initiate
investigations on its behalf. The Agreement establishes the only "Board approved" procedures for
conducting said investigations. Pursuant to Exhibit "A" of the Agreement, mOL was clearly within
its authority to initiate the J anoush investigation after receiving a written and signed complaint. R.
Agency, Vol. I, Tab No. 25, Exh. "A," Agreement For Services Benveen the Idaho State Real Estate
Appraiser Board and the Bureau of Occupational Licenses, Exh. "A," IBOL Complaint Policy and
Procedure, p. 17.
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2.

The Bureau of Occupational Licenses Was Not Precluded from Initiating an
Investigation Due to the Absence of a Sworn Complaint.

Williams argues that "while I.e. § 54-4106(2)(c) provides the general authority for the Board

to conduct investigations into the activities of licensed appraisers, I.e. § 54-4107 provides the
specific method by which the Board may initiate these investigations." Petitioner's Brief, p. 19.
Williams then cites the 2005 version of I.e. § 54-4107, and states that "[t]he board shall upon a
written sworn complaint or may upon its own motion investigate the actions of any state licensed
or certified real estate appraiser. ... " Id. (Emphasis in Petitioner's Brief.) Williams then argues that
"where two statutes appear to apply the same case or subject matter, the specific statute will control
over the more general statute." Id. at 20.
While it is a general rule of statutory construction that specific statutes control over general
statutes, it is also well established law that statutes relating to the same subject matter must be
construed together and in harmony. Paolini v. Albertsons, Inc., 143 Idaho 547,149 P.3d 822,824
(2006). It is also a well established rule of statutory construction that an agency's interpretation of
a statute that it is charged with administering will be given substantial deference and will be upheld
unless unreasonable. l.R. Simp/of Co., Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 120 Idaho 849 (1991);

Pearl v. Board of Professional Discipline of the Idaho State Bd. of Medicine, ]37 Idaho 107 (2002).
The 2005 version of I.e. § 54-4107(1), was in effect on July 1,2004; the date the Board
entered into the "Agreement for Services Between the Idaho State Real Estate Appraiser Board and
the Bureau of Occupational Licenses." When the specific contract language establishing the formal
policy and procedure for the handling the investigation of complaints is compared against the
provisions of I.e. § 54-4107( 1) in effect at that time (same as the 2005 version), it is clear that the
Board interpreted its law to allow the Bureau to conduct investigations based upon a "written and
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signed complaint." R. Agency, Vol. I, Tab No. 25, Exh. "A," Agreement For Services Between the

Idaho State Real Estate Appraiser Board and the Bureau of Occupational Licenses, Exh. "A," IBOL
Complaint Policy and Procedure, p. 17. The Board has never interpreted its law to require "sworn
complaints" prior to the Bureau initiating an investigation, which is also consistent with the Board's
general power to investigate. See, I.e. § 54-4106(2)(c).
In the alternative, the Board's interpretation of the statute is that if Mr. Janoush had filed a
"sworn" complaint, the specific terms of the pre-July 1,2008, I.e. § 54-41 07( 1) would have required
an investigation. However, because Mr. Janoush did not file a sworn complaint, the more general
provisions of I.e. § 54-4106(2)( c) permitted an investigation. That is, the pre-July 1,2008 version
of I.e. § 54-4107(1) taken together with I.e. § 54-4106(2)(c), provides mOL with discretion to
investigate any alleged violations of the Board's law or rules that came to its attention, unless a
person has filed a written sworn complaint with the Board, in which case the Board had no discretion
whether to investigate, but "shall" investigate.
Pursuant to its statute. the Board lawfully granted mOL the authority to initiate investigations
on its behalf based upon a written and signed complaint. There has been no showing that the
Board's interpretation of its own law violated any constitutional or statutory provisions; exceeded
the Board's statutory authority; were made upon unlawful procedure; were unsupported by
substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.
Therefore, the court must defer to the agency's findings of fact unless those findings are clearly
erroneous and unsupported by evidence in the record. Cooper, 134 Idaho at 454.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 9.

Additionally, to the extent there was any error in the original complaint procedure, the Board
rectified the same in its Remand Order (R. Agency, Vol. I, Tab No. 41) on January 31,2011, in
which it stated "the Board hereby ratifies the investigation and formal action in this matter."

c.

Petitioner's Issues Raised for the First Time on Appeal With Respect to Idaho Code §
54-4107(1)(c), (d), (e) are Precluded from Consideration and Fail on the Merits.
In section D of Petitioner's Brief, Williams raises several issues with respect to the statutory

bases for some of the findings against him. One of his issues is raised for the first time to this Court.
The other issues were raised for the first time on appeal to the District Court, as noted by the District
Court. (R., p. 59l.)
The Board raised its objection to the consideration of his arguments on these issues in its
Respondent's Brief to the District Court and at oral argument. (R., p. 486; Tr., p. 36. L.21, p. 37,
L.2.) To the extent the District Court considered these improperly raised issues, it erred in engaging
in a review of the issue; however, the Board does not disagree with the reasoning it employed in its
review. The Board preserved its objection to the review of issues on appeal and does not now waive
its objection. Hence, any issues not argued to the Hearing Officer or Board are precluded from
consideration by this Court. Whitted v. Canyon County Board of Comrnissioners, 137 Idaho 118,
121-122 (2002). Therefore, none of the issues argued in Section D of Petitioner's Brief are
appropriately before this Court and should not be considered.

1.

The Constitutionality on.c. § 54-4107 Is on Appeal For The First Time to This
Court And May Not Be Considered, and the Statute Is Sufficiently Definite to
Satisfv Due Process.

The Hearing Officer and the Board found that Williams violated I.e. § 54-4107(l)(c) by
making a substantial misrepresentation regarding his accessing the Wells Fargo RETECH system
under the user name and password of other appraisers; that Williams violated I.e. § 54-4107(l)(c)
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and (e) by certifying that he personally inspected the two properties when he did not do so; and that
his conduct as related to the Donnelly Appraisal also violated I.e. § 54-4107(l)(d) and (e). (R.

Agency, Vol. II, Tab No. 96, Final Order, p. 2.) Williams now argues that I.e. § 54-4107(l)(c) and
(e) are unconstitutionally vague, thereby violating his due process.
However, this is the first time Williams has raised this issue; he did not raise it before the
Hearing Officer, the Board, or the District Court. Hence. Williams' constitutional issue is improperly
raised. Cowan v. Bd. ofComm'rs of Fremont Cry., 143 Idaho 501, 510 (2006). Therefore, it is
precluded from consideration by this Court. Id.
Additionally, the terms in the statute with which the Petitioner now takes issue, are
sufficiently definite to adequately warn licensed real estate appraisers as to what conduct is
prohibited. Specifically, Williams contends that the terms "substantial misrepresentation" (I.e. § 544107(l)(c» and "being negligent or incompetent" (I.e. § 54-4107(l)(e»

are so vague that

Mr. Wi1liams was unable to discern what conduct would subject him to discipline. (Petitioner's
Brief, p. 26.) However, each of these statutory provisions provide constitutionally sufficient notice
of the conduct that could subject Mr. Williams to discipline.
Initially, a term is not void for vagueness when it can be reasonably and rationally interpreted
based on the ordinary and common meaning of the words. Dupont v. Idaho St. Bd. Of Land

Comm'rs, 134 Idaho 618, 623 (2000). Further, the fact that the application of a term is determined
on a fact specific basis and may vary from case to case does not render it unconstitutionally vague.

Id. The court will still consider whether the term can be reasonably interpreted.
Furthermore, in the professional licensing context, a term is not unconstitutionally vague
when it is evaluated against the declared standards of a profession. This Court has found that grounds
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for discipline are unconstitutionally vague when a professional licensing board only uses its
collective knowledge, expertise, and experience to determine whether a licensee's conduct was
subject to discipline. H & V Engr., Inc. v. Idaho St. Bd. of Prof Engrs. and Land Surveyors, 113
Idaho 646, 650 (1987); Tuma v. Bd. of Nursing, 100 Idaho 74 (1979). The boards in those cases
applied their knowledge on a case by case basis essentially resulting in an ex postfacto standard of
conduct. Hence, there was no pre-existing "backdrop" against which a licensee or a court could
evaluate or review the licensee's conduct. Id.
A board provides a backdrop by setting a standard of conduct. Id. Similarly, although some
terms standing alone may be ambiguous, when a professional licensing board sets standards against
which those terms can be judged, a licensee has adequate notice in advance of his conduct. Tuma,
100 Idaho at 80. Once the backdrop is set by professional standards, a hearing officer may be guided
on the application of those professional standards through the use of expert testimony at the hearing.
Kruegerv. Bd.

(~f Pr~fessional Discipline (~l1daho

State Bd. ofMedicine, 122 Idaho 577, 580 (1992).

When the standard is furthered elucidated by testimony of individuals with experience, technical
competence, or specialized knowledge, a hearing officer is properly able to determine whether the
licensee's conduct met the professional standard. !d. at 580-581. In these circumstances, grounds
for discipline meet constitutional standards.

In short, the void for vagueness doctrine only requires that professional standards of conduct
"cannot be kept secret from the professionals or the courts." H & V Engineering, 113 Idaho at 651.
Ultimately, statutory grounds for discipline are sufficiently definite to satisfy due process when a
Board declares the standards against which a licensee's conduct will be evaluated, and then when
a licensee is called to account for his conduct, it evaluates that conduct against those standards.
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In this case, the term "substantial misrepresentation" in I.e. § 54-4107(1)( c) is sufficiently
definite because it can be reasonably interpreted by its ordinary meaning. The dictionary definition
of "misrepresent" is "to give a false or misleading representation of [,] usually with an intent to
deceive or be unfair." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 744 (lOth Ed., 1999). Although the
definition references that a misrepresentation is usually accompanied by an intent to deceive, intent
of the individual making the misrepresentation is not a required element. Also, one of the definitions
of the term "substantial" is "considerable in quantity" and "significantly great." Merriam-Webster,
1174. Further, another meaning of "substantial" is "having great meaning or lasting effect," and
antonyms are identified as "inconsequential, inconsiderable, insignificant, little, minor, negligible."
Merriam-Webster

Thesaurus,

Merriam-Webster.com.

27

Dec.

2013,

<www.merriam-

webster.comlthesaurus/substantial>. Thus. the term "substantial misrepresentation"

can be

reasonably interpreted using the ordinary meaning that when an licensed appraiser makes a
representation that is false or misleading, and which is more than inconsequential, that licensee has
made a substantial misrepresentation and is subject to discipline.
Additionally, the terms "negligent" and "incompetent" as used in I.e. § 54-4107(l)(e) are
not unconstitutionally vague because they have a common meaning and are measured against the
declared professional standards of the Board. At the outset, as the District Court noted, the usual and
common meaning of the terms negligent and incompetent may be employed and do not require
further definition. (R., pp. 591-592.) Furthermore, subsection (l)(e) states in full, as a grounds for
discipline, "being negligent or incompetent, as defined in the uniform standards of professional
appraisal practices in developing an appraisal and preparing an appraisal report or in communicating
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an appraisal." Thus the terms negligent and incompetent do not stand alone and are measured against
the backdrop of the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practices (USPAP).
The USPAP sets forth the minimal standards of performance and skill required of real estate
appraisers. The statute directly states that the USPAP is the standard for developing an appraisal,
preparing an appraisal report, or in communicating an appraisal. More so, lDAPA 24.18.01.700
provides "[t]he [USPAP] as published by the Appraisal Foundation and referenced in Section 004,
are hereby adopted as the rules of conduct for all Real Estate Appraisers licensed under Title 54,
Chapter 41, Idaho Code and these rules." This notice in statute and rule is very different from the
unannounced standards at issue in Tuma and H & V, in which the licensees' conduct was only
measured against the boards' experience and knowledge. In this case, the standards of conduct to
which Mr. Williams was held were not hidden or secret; the Board had explicitly declared that the
USP AP was the declared standards of the profession.
Additionally, as reviewed by the District Court, the Hearing Officer heard testimony
regarding Williams' conduct in comparison to the standards of the USPAP. (R., pp. 578-579,581582,587-589.) Accordingly, the Hearing Officer and Board were guided on the application of the
USP AP through the use of expert testimony at the hearing. Thus, the Hearing Officer properly
evaluated Mr. Williams' conduct against the professional standards adopted in statute and rule.
Ultimately,

I.e. § 54-4107( 1)( e) is sufficiently definite to satisfy due process because Mr. Williams

had notice that his conduct was required to conform to the USPAP, as the standards of his
profession, and his conduct was evaluated against those standards.

In conclusion, Mr. Williams was afforded due process because the statutes and rules of the
Board, through their ordinary meaning and by the express declaration of standards of conduct, were
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sufficiently definite to adequately notify him of the professional standards to which he would be held
and the conduct that would subject him to discipline.

2.

Petitioner's Issues Raised on Appeal for the First Time to the District Court
Were Improper and May Not Be Considered.

The Petitioner reasserts a number of issues regarding the statutory bases for some of the
findings against him, which he raised for the first time on appeal to the District Court. However,
these issues were improperly raised at that point and are again improperly raised here; and therefore,
they should not be determined by this Court. Whitted, 137 Idaho at 122. For an issue to be properly
raised for judicial review, '"the record must reveal an adverse ruling" on that issue. ld. at 121.
Therefore, the only way to preserve an issue for appeal is to raise it before the Board.ld. at 122.
The District Court correctly noted that the issues regarding the bases for finding violations
under I.C § 54-4107(1)( c ), (d), and (e) were improperly raised for the firsttime on judicial review.
(R., p. 591.) Although the District Court's cursory discussion regarding the flaws in Williams'

argument on these issues was substantively correct, it procedurally erred to the extent it engaged in
the determination of the issues because those issues were not properly before it. Similarly, these
issues are not properly raised for consideration before this Court. The issues were not preserved for
appeal because the Board was never given the opportunity to make a determination on these
arguments; the agency record does not reflect an adverse determination on these issues.
More so, Williams' argument regarding these issues lacks merit because (1) the Board found
that Williams violated the Board's statutes, rules, and standards in the USPAP, which supports a
finding of the violation of I.C § 54-4107(1 jed); (2) negligence and incompetence are determined
as a whole by the USPAP; and (3) the Board was justified in finding that the substantial error in the
Donnelly Appraisal was a substantial misrepresentation in violation of I.C § 54-4107(1)(c).
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First, the Board found Williams violated I.e. § 54-4107(1)(d) with respect to the Donnelly
Appraisal. As further discussed below, the Board found that Williams' actions with respect to this
appraisal were in violation of not only I.e. § 54-4107(l)(d) and (e), but also IDAPA 24.18.01.700,
and USPAP (2005) Standards l-l(b), 1-2(e)(l) and 1-3(a). (R. Agency, Vol. II, Tab

~o.

96, p. 2.)

Thus, Williams was found to have violated other "provisions of this chapter and any rules of the
board" separate and apart from I. e. § 54-4107 ( 1)( e). Hence, the Board's findings that he violated I. e.
§ 54-4107(l)(d) have a sound basis in the Record and are not duplicative or redundant.
Second, Williams' argument that the terms "negligent" and "incompetent" are not
specifically defined in the USPAP is misleading, although now Williams appears to characterize this
argument as void for vagueness, as discussed above. (Petitioner's Brief, p. 27.) The Board will not
restate its argument again, except to assert that the fact that these words do not have specific,
independent definitions in the USP AP does not render the statute hollow. The standards prescribed
in the USP AP are the gauge to determine what conduct is negligent and incompetent. Further, this
court must "interpret a statute in a manner that will not nullify it, and it is not to be presumed that
the legislature performed an idle act of enacting a superfluous statute." Sweitzer v. Dean, 118 Idaho
568, 571-572 (1990). The court will construe a statute to avoid "mere surplusage of provisions
included therein" and to give it a reasonable operation of law. [d. Therefore, rather than finding that
I.e. § 54-4107(1)( e) is meaningless, this Court should affirm the lower court's determination that
the terms negligent and incompetent are capable of interpretation and may be reasonably construed
against the backdrop of the USPAP. (R., pp. 591-592.)
The Record reflects that the Hearing Officer and Board reviewed the USP AP standards
applicable to Williams in those counts where the Board ultimately found a violation of I.e. § 54-
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4107( 1)(e) (the two counts relating to Williams' failure to personally inspect properties and the count
relating to the Donnelly Appraisal), and thus they based a finding of a violation of that statute upon
Williams' failure to adhere to the requirements of the USPAP. Accordingly, the Board's findings
that Williams violated I.e. § 54-4107(l)(e) are supported by fact and well founded in the law.
Lastly, Williams tries to parse words in attacking the Board's finding that his Donnelly
Appraisal contained a substantial misrepresentation with respect to the available sewer facilities in
violation of I.e. § 54-4107(l)(c). The Hearing Officer plainly found that Williams' appraisal
contained a significant, material misrepresentation regarding the availability of sewer services to the
appraised properties. And although the Hearing Officer deemed this to be a "substantial error," the
fact remains that this information in the Donnelly Appraisal constituted a substantial
misrepresentation of the sewer services available to the properties, whether or not it was intentional.
The information was both an error and a misrepresentation. The Board was well within its discretion
to find a violation of I.e. § 54-4107(l)(c) based upon the evidence produced in the hearing and the
findings of the Hearing Officer.

D.

There Was Substantial and Competent Evidence Supporting the Wells Fargo
RETECHS Charge (Count One).
Mr. Williams argues that there was insufficient evidence before the Board to find against him

with respect to Count One involving the Wells Fargo RETECHS system. This Count alleged that
Williams had accessed the Wells Fargo RETECHS real estate appraiser computerized bidding
system on multiple occasions using a competitor appraiser's name and password, which access
allowed Williams to underbid the competitor. Count One alleged this was a violation of I.e.§ 544107(1)(c), which prohibits making any substantial misrepresentation, false promise or false or
fraudulent representation. (See R. Agency, Vol. I, Tab No. 53, Amended Complaint, p. 2.) After a

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 17.

thorough review of the agency record, the District Court agreed with the Hearing Officer's findings
that Williams' conduct violated

I.e. § 54-4107(l)(c). (R., pp. 572-576.)

The Hearing Officer found the following with respect to Count One (see R. Agency, Vol. II,
Tab No. 88, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order, pp. 4-11):
1) That the Wells Fargo RETECHS system was an online bidding system for
Idaho appraisers to present bids for appraisal work to Wells Fargo Bank by
submitting bids by email to the bank's website, including the dollar amount for the
service and the time to perform the service. Each eligible appraiser was provided a
username and password by Wells Fargo under which the appraiser was invited by
email from Wells Fargo to submit bids for Wells Fargo appraisal work.
2) Petitioner Williams accessed RETECHS, without any authorization, on
twelve to fifteen separate occasions using the username and password of appraiser
Brad Janoush and/or Brad Knipe during 2002. This finding was based on several
pieces of evidence, including:
a) Scott Calhoun observed Williams entering the user names and passwords
of Janoush and Knipe;
b) Williams admitted to Tony Orman that he entered RETECHS under the
names and passwords of Knipe and J anoush;
c) Williams admitted in a March 2003 deposition he had entered RETECHS
under Janoush's username and password;
d) Williams admitted to Dean Emmanuels he entered RETECHS under
Janoush's username and password. Significantly, Emmanuels was Williams'
own witness at the hearing;
e) Williams admitted to Sam Langston, who was Williams' business partner
at the time of the admission, that he entered RETECHS under Janoush's
username and password ten to fifteen times. Williams also admitted to
Langston that his doing so was "stupid" thing to do;
f) Langston dissolved the business of Langston-Williams, Inc. after Williams'
admission based upon Langston's belief that Williams had engaged in
inappropriate conduct by using other appraisers' user names and passwords
to enter RETECHS.
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3) Access to RETECHS under other users' user names and passwords
provided Williams the opportunity to observe what those appraisers were bidding on
Wells Fargo's requests for appraisal services in terms of the dollar amounts of the
other appraisers' bids and other appraisers' estimated completion times.
4) During 2002 the Knipe, Janoush, Knipe firm experienced a reduction of
work for Wells Fargo in 2002 at the time Williams was accessing the RETECHS
accounts of J anoush and Knipe. Wells Fargo indicated to this firm the reason for the
reduction in business was because it was consistently being underbid by another
appraiser. J anoush later submitted a test bid to Wells Fargo in the RETECHS system
by bidding on a project with a substantially discounted price and an unusually short
completion date. He later learned that he was underbid on that project both on price
and the completion time frame.
5) Williams chose not to deny any of the allegations made against him at the
hearing with respect to his unauthorized RETECHS access.
Thus, there was substantial and competent evidence submitted to the Hearing Officer to
prove that Williams had improperly accessed the RETECHS system as alleged. This, standing alone,
is a violation of I.C § 54A107(1 )(c), where Williams made false representations to Wells Fargo
regarding his identity, which false representations allowed him to gain an unfair business advantage
over J anoush and Knipe with respect to Wells Fargo appraisal work.
On judicial review, Williams still does not deny that he accessed the RETECHS system as
alleged. Rather, he argues that there was no evidence that he ever looked at bids of other appraisers
when he accessed the RETECHS system, or that any other appraiser's business was impacted by his
activities. Williams further tries to argue that Wells Fargo never intended for the RETECHS system
to be confidential. These arguments fail to undermine the findings of the Hearing Officer and the
Final Order of the Board.
First, with respect to Williams' argument that there was no evidence he ever looked at bids
of other appraisers on the RETECHS system, the findings of the Hearing Officer are most
appropriate. As the Hearing Officer observed:
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Such access on an admitted 12-15 occasions cannot have been out of innocent
motives. It is possible that Mr. Williams may have entered RETECHS under other
appraisers' user names and passwords once or twice out of curiosity just to see if he
could do so. The only conceivable reason for Mr. Williams to enter RETECHS
twelve to fifteen times under other appraisers' user names and passwords was so that
Mr. Williams could observe what other appraisers were bidding on specific appraisal
projects.
Jd., at 10. Williams claims in his Brief on Appeal that he "has never denied that when Wells Fargo

Bank had established the RETECHS bidding system in 2002 he, out of curiosity, logged onto the
first page of the system under another appraiser's name .... "(Petitioner's Brief, p. 29.) Yet as the
Hearing Officer deduced, curiosity does not explain why Williams would have done so 12-15 times.

!d. The only logical reason for Williams to continue misrepresenting himself to Wells Fargo
repeatedly well past the curious stage was to obtain the information contained in those accounts. Jd.
More importantly, however, as the Hearing Officer duly noted, I.e. § 54-4107(1 )(c) does not
have a requirement of damages or even ill intent. !d., at 11. Rather, it simply prohibits H[mJaking
any substantial misrepresentation, false promises or false or fraudulent misrepresentation." I.e. §
54-4107( 1)(c). Thus, Williams violated the statute merely by logging in as someone he was not. The
clear intent behind the RETECHS system was for appraisers to be able to submit appraisal bids for
Wells Fargo work. By logging in as lanoush and Knipe between 12-15 times, Williams was
misrepresenting who he was to Wells Fargo. which in turn allowed Williams to view the information
that would normally be confined to the individual assigned to the account.
The misrepresentation and fraud is significant here given the context in which it took place.
As a licensed real estate appraiser, Williams was misrepresenting himself to a major lending
institution and source of business for real estate appraisers, which misrepresentations allowed him
access to sensitive bidding information from his competitors that would enable him to undercut them
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on appraisal bids. Such misrepresentations go to the very core of integrity and fairness among
licensed appraisers and had the potential to financially damage those affected by Williams' actions.
Second, with respect to Williams' claim that no damages were proven as a result of his use
of the RETECHS system, again, there is no requirement for a showing of damages under

I.e. § 54-

4107(l)(c), as explained above.
More so, the Hearing Officer also noted 1anoush' s testimony that his appraisal business with
Wells Fargo was reduced during 2002, which was the time Williams was logging into lanoush's
RETECHS account. Id., at 11. The Hearing Officer also noted that even when lanoush entered a bid
that was substantially lower than normal, along with a completion time that was significantly shorter
than ususal, he was nevertheless outbid. Id., at 6-7. Thus, there was substantiaL competent evidence
to demonstrate that "Mr. Williams received an unfair advantage over his competitor appraisers by
entering RETECHS under the names of lanoush and Knipe, and that the KJK firm suffered a
reduction of business as a direct result." Id., at II.
Third, Petitioner's argument that the RETECHS system was not meant to be confidential is
belied by several problems. Initially, whether the system was confidential or not, the undisputed fact
remains that Williams represented himself to be either 1anoush or Knipe repeatedly to the RETECHS
system by using their user names and passwords. It is also undisputed that by doing so Williams was
purposely accessing their appraisal bid information, not his own. "By entering RETECHS under a
user name and password, Mr. Williams represented to Wells Fargo that he was the person authorized
to use the assigned user name and password." Id., at 10. This is a blatant misrepresentation and fraud
upon the Wells Fargo system, regardless of whether it was meant to be confidential or not.
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More so, the system was obviously meant to be confidential. The fact that it required a user
name and password for access, as well as the fact that the very nature of the system was to allow
appraisers to enter confidential bids on Wells Fargo appraisal work, plainly showed that the intent
of the system was to be confidential. As the Hearing Officer found, "[tJhe fact that Wells Fargo
attempted to protect access to the on-line bidding system by the use of the user names and passwords
establishes that Wells Fargo intended the system to be confidential." ld., at 10. The confidentiality
of the system created a process through which Wells Fargo received the lowest bid while being fair
to competing appraisers.
Accordingly, the District Court found that there was substantial and competent evidence in
the record to support the Hearing Officer's findings. CR., p. 576.) Also, it agreed with the Board that
Williams' conduct in accessing the RETECHS system using other appraisers' names and passwords
rose to the level of a violation of I.C § 54-4107(l)(c). Id. This Court should find the same; the
Board's Final Order as to the Wells Fargo RETECHS issue must be upheld on judicial review.

E.

There 'Vas Substantial and Competent Evidence Supporting the Board's Findings as
to Williams' Failure to Personally Inspect Properties.
The District Court's detailed review of the agency record demonstrated that there was

substantial and competent evidence to support the Hearing Officer's determination that Williams had
falsely certified that he personally inspected appraised properties and that this constituted violations
ofI.C § 54-4107(l)(c) and (e). (R., p. 582.) The Hearing Officer found that the evidence showed
that, as alleged in two separate instances, Williams certified that he had personally inspected
properties as part of appraisals when he had not done so. (R. Agency, Vol. II, Tab No. 96, Final
Order, p. 2.)
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Specifically, with respect to two properties-the Center Partners Call Center property
appraisal (R. Agency, Exh. 45) and the Tri-Circle Facility on Oneida Street in Rupert, Idaho (R.
Agency, Exh. 54 )-the Board found Williams had co-signed certifications for these appraisals stating

he and another appraiser "have made a personal inspection of the property that is the subject of this
report" when Williams had never visited the properties prior to make the certifications. (R. Agency,
Vol. II, Tab No. 88, Findings, pp. 11-19.) The Hearing Officer found that Williams' actions violated

I.e. § 54-4107( 1)(c) (making any substantial misrepresentation, false promise, or false or fraudulent
misrepresentation): I.e. § 54-4107(1)(e) (negligence or incompetence as defined by professional
standards in developing or communicating an appraisal); and USPAP 2001 and 2002 Ethics
Rule-Conduct Section, and Standards Rules I-I (c), 2-(1 )(a) and 2-3 by certifying he personally
inspected the properties when he did not do so. (See id., p. 15 for the text of the rules.) The record
shows there was substantial and competent evidence to support both findings by the Board.
First, the record established there was no evidence in the appraiser job files that Williams
personally inspected those properties. (Id., pp. 12-13, U 30, 37.) And in fact, one of the two
individuals with whom Williams had co-signed on the appraisal report (Calhoun) had asked
Williams to remove the language in those reports certifying Williams had personally inspected the
properties based on that appraiser's belief that Williams had not done so. (Id., p. 13, q[ 39.) And in
one instance, Calhoun actually removed the certification paragraph from an appraisal report based
on his belief Williams had not visited the property, although Williams subsequently replaced the
language and threatened Calhoun with not being paid if he refused to sign it with the joint
certification language. (Id., p. 13, q[ 40.) Williams had admitted to an attorney, Larry Prince, in the
presence of Calhoun that Williams had not, prior to the issuance of the appraisal report, personally
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inspected the Tri-Circle Facility on Oneida Street in Rupert, Idaho. (R. Agency, Exh. 54.) (ld., p.
13,'1{42.)

And with respect to the Center Partners Call Center property appraisal (R. Agency, Exh. 45),
the Hearing Officer found, "it was highly unlikely that Mr. Williams personally inspected the
appraised property because of the distance from Boise, the short time window to complete the
appraisal, no evidence in the job file that Mr. Williams personally inspected, and the fact that
Mr. Williams did not follow the office protocol of billing for travel costs associated with the
appraisal." (ld., p. 14, ~[44.) The Hearing Office found that Williams' office protocol was for travel
expenses to be deducted off the top before the fee split between Williams and Calhoun. But in this
instance, no travel expenses had been deducted for a trip to Post Falls." (ld., p. 18.)
Although Williams presented other evidence at the hearing that he had personally inspected
many of the properties identified in Counts Two through Five, the Hearing Officer and Board found
that Williams had not inspected these two properties (Tri-Circle Facility and Center Partners Call
Center property) based on the evidence above. Id.
Williams now argues there is no requirement upon an appraiser to personally inspect a
property as part of the appraisal process. (Petitioner's Brief, p. 32.) Yet the finding against Williams
was not that he had simply failed to do the personal inspection, but that he had certified in the
appraisal report he had done so. The language in the Center Partners Call Center property Certificate
of Appraisal signed by Williams states: "We have made a personal inspection of the property that
is the subject of this report." (R. Agency, Exh. 45-A, p. 8.) The same language appears in the
Certificate of Appraisal for the Tri-Circle Facility (R. Agency, Exh. 54-A, p. 9). This was a violation
of the pertinent laws cited by the Board where Williams had not actually done so.
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And although Williams testified he had personally inspected the properties, the Hearing
Officer found against him based on all other evidence presented as identified above. As Idaho courts
have held, "[s]ubstantial and competent evidence need not be uncontradicted, nor does it need to
necessarily lead to a certain conclusion." Cowan, 143 Idaho at 517. This standard holds true even
though there is conflicting evidence in the record. Soto v. Simp/at, 126 Idaho 536, 539 (1994).
Again, Williams himself told attorney Prince he had not inspected the Tri-Circle Facility prior to
signing the certification, and the evidence with respect to the Center Partners Call Center property
was more than sufficient to support the Hearing Officer's determination. By the plain language of
the certifications in those appraisals, Williams had stated he had personally inspected the properties.
Also, Wi lliams argues that all the USPAP standards require to establish a personal inspection
is the signed certificate of the appraiser. (Petitioner's Brief, p. 33.) But this sidesteps the question
at issue as to whether Williams truthfully signed the certificates on these two properties. The
evidence found by the Hearing Officer and adopted by the Board was that Williams had not
truthfully signed these two certificates, and in so doing had violated the laws and rules at issue.
Hence, the Board's Final Order must be upheld as to these charges.

F.

There Was Substantial and Competent Evidence Supporting the Board's Findings as
to the Donnelly Appraisal.
Again after a detailed review of the record, the District Court found in favor of the Board

regarding the determination that in preparing the Donnelly Appraisal, Mr. Williams violated I.e. §
54-4107(l)(e), which subjects a licensed real estate appraiser to discipline for negligent or
incompetent preparation of appraisal reports.
In 2005, Williams conducted an appraisal of two adjoining properties located near Donnelly,

Idaho. One of the appraised properties was an approximately 5-acre parcel, and the other was an
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approximately 63-acre parcel. Williams' appraisal was an opinion regarding the combined value of
the two parcels which were under contract from two different sellers to the same buyer. Williams'
appraisal opined that the two parcels together had an appraised value of $5,100,000. (R. Agency, Vol.
II, Tab No. 88, Findings, p. 22.) Williams hired an assistant appraiser to assist him on this project,
and Williams was fully responsible for the contents and conclusions ofthe appraisal. !d .. pp. 22-23.
At the time of the appraisal there was a pressurized sewer line adjacent to the appraised
properties, but that sewer line was at capacity and only one residential hookup was permitted by the
sewer district for those properties. More so, the sewer district's treatment plant was also at capacity.
It was contemplated it would be at least two years before sewer capacity would be available such that

the appraised properties would be able to connect to sewer services for multi-use development. This
was not reported in Williams' appraisal, although the properties were being purchased with the
specific intent of multi-use development. !d., pp. 23-24. Instead, Williams stated in the appraisal
report that, "the North Lake Sewer District reported that water and sewer was across the road ... :'
Id., p. 24, q[ 65. The comment to the subject property's 5-acre parcel in the comparable land sales

table states: "Subject located in City impact zone for commercial and sewer is across the road." (R.
Agency, Exh. 802, p. 48.) This statement failed to clarify that only one residential hookup would be

allowed from the appraised properties. Jd.
USPAP (2005) Standards Rule 1- ] (b) provides:

In developing a real property appraisal, an appraiser must: ... (b) not commit a
substantial error of omission or commission that significantly affects an appraisal. .

USPAP (2005) Standards Rule 1-2(e)(l) states:

In developing a real property appraisal, an appraiser must. .. (e) identify the
characteristics of the property that are relevant to the type and definition of value and
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intended use of the appraisal, including (1) its location and physical, legal and
economic attributes ....
No departures are permitted from these two rules.
USPAP (2005) Standards Rule 1-3(a) sets forth:
When the value opinion to be developed is market value, and given the scope of work
identified in accordance with Standards Rule 1-2(f), an appraiser must:
(a) identify and analyze the effect and use and value of existing land use
regulations, reasonably probable modifications of such land use regulations,
economic supply and demand, the physical adaptability of the real estate, and
market area trends ....
In evaluating these standards, the Hearing Officer found-and the Board agreed-that the error
regarding the sewer availability to the appraised properties was "substantial" for purposes of US PAP
Standards Rule 1-1(b). (R. Agency, Vol. II, Tab No. 88, Findings, p. 29.) In so finding, the Hearing
Officer observed that, "[ w ]ithout sewer service availability it is unlikely that the appraised properties
could have been developed as a mixed-use development, until the appraised properties were annexed
into the Sewer District and sewer service was made available, likely at considerable cost to the
developer." ld. "Mixed-use development is only possible if sewer is available for a mixed-use
project. Consequently, a developer cares very much whether sewer service is available. or, if not,
the terms, conditions and costs to make sewer service available." ld., p. 30. And, "because the
Donnelly Appraisal incorrectly stated the availability of sewer service, there was no discussion or
analysis regarding the land use regulations. There was no discussion regarding annexation into the
Sewer District or into the City of Donnelly, or how long this would take or what it might cost, in
violation of US PAP Standards Rule 1-3(a)." ld., pp. 30-31.

In claiming the Board erred in finding the above, Williams does not contest the fact that his
appraisal misleadingly identified the sewer availability to the properties and omitted substantial
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information with respect to the sewer capacity actually available and how it would impact multi-use
development on the properties. While Williams claims that his assistant appraiser (Mike Victory)
confirmed with numerous individuals regarding the availability of sewer to the appraised properties,
he fails to include in his argument the fact that Victory never identified to these individuals that he
was seeking sewer connections for mixed-use property. /d., p. 24 rn 66. As the Board found, this
misrepresentation was substantial, as it materially affected the value ofthe properties appraised due
to the unavailability of sewer services to mixed-use properties contemplated by the sale.
Hence, as the District Court found, there was substantial and competent evidence to support
the Board's findings as to the Donnelly Appraisal and the sewer availability issue. Thus, the Board's
Final Order must be upheld in that respect.

G.

Brad Janoush Never Participated in the Final Order Proceedings.
Mr. Williams claims the Board's Final Order was tainted by the bias of Board Chairman Brad

1anoush, who was personally involved in the Wells Fargo RETECHS claim against Williams.
Williams then claims that because Mr. lanoush is the Chairman of the Board he somehow
impermissibly biased the rest of the Board members against Williams, thus tainting the final
outcome. Williams' arguments are without merit and must be dismissed.
As the record demonstrates, Mr. lanoush neither participated in the discussion nor voted on
the outcome memorialized by the Final Order in this case. The Final Order itself initially notes that
J anoush "recused himself from the discussion and voting in the matter, and Vice-Chairman Paul
Morgan took over the meeting." (R. Agency, Vol. n, Tab No. 96, p. 1.) More so, the meeting minutes
from the February 10,2012 Board meeting, during which the Williams proceeding was discussed
and voted upon, also reflect that Mr. lanoush recused himself immediately upon the matter being
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taken up for consideration; the minutes note, upon the case being presented by the Board's attorney,
"Mr. lanoush recused himself from the discussion and voting on case REA-2008-41." (R., p. 402.)
As such, the record demonstrates that Mr. 1anoush never participated in the discussion and voting
by the Board that culminated in the February 2012 Final Order.
More so, Williams' argument that Mr. lanoush somehow poisoned the minds of the other
Board members prior to this meeting are unfounded and speculative at best. As noted by the District
Court, "Williams has also not provided any specific assertions as to how Mr. lanoush was able to
taint and bias the Board vote." (R., p. 590.) That Mr. lanoush served on the Board with these other
individuals, standing alone, cannot constitute any type of a basis for bias among the other Board
members in this matter. Accordingly, the District Court correctly found that, based on identical
assertions as presented to this Court, Williams had failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that
the Hearing Officer and Board were biased. /d.
Petitioner points to the meeting minutes of the Board from March 21, 20] 1 (Petitioner's
Brief, p. 35), during which Mr. lanoush stated that he would recuse himself from consideration of
the Wells Fargo RETECHS charge against Williams, but not from the remaining charges. (R., p.
398.) Yet during that same meeting, 1anoush abstained from voting on the sole matter relating to
Williams on the Board agenda that day: consideration of a settlement agreement. Id. Moreover,

J anoush' s statement refusing to recuse himself from the other charges recorded in the minutes as
follows: "Mr. lanoush stated that it was important for him to take a position." Id. At no time did he
communicate that he could not hear the facts of the case fairly with an open mind, that he could not
apply Idaho law, or that he had already made up his mind as to the final outcome. Rather. he simply
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stated he wanted to take a position-not saying what position that was-on the remaining charges in
the case.
Notably, at the time of the March 21, 2011 meeting, the process was still ongoing before the
Hearing Officer. The hearing did not begin until August 2011, some five months later. The Hearing
Officer did not issue Findings until November 15,2011, nearly eight months later. Thus, at the time
of the March 2011 meeting, the Board was not considering anything related to the evidence presented
in the case or findings of the Hearing Officer, as those had yet to be presented and completed.
Further, at no time prior to February 10, 2012, did the evidence and findings ever come before the
Board for consideration. Thus, there was no opportunity between the time Mr. lanoush made his
statements during the March 2011 meeting, and the time he recused himself in full during the
February 2012 meeting, for him or any other Board member to consider this case as a Board.
Mr. Williams can say that there was a period of almost a year during which Mr. lanoush had
a statement on the record indicating he was not going to recuse himself from all but one of the
charges, but the fact remains that during those eleven months the Board never considered anything
relating to Mr. Williams' case, and accordingly Mr. lanoush never had the opportunity to participate
in any such consideration during that time period. Williams does not offer specific assertions to
prove otherwise. Thus, the District Court properly found that Williams failed to adequately support
his argument, and this Court should find the same.

H.

The Board's Order Was Reasonable and Within its Discretion.
Where Williams' claims that the Board was arbitrary, capricious, and abused its discretion

because the penalties set forth in the Final Order were disproportionate to punitive action taken
against other licensees were rejected by the District Court (R., p. 593), he then claims that the Board
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abused its discretion because of the relative quantity of violations that were found, Mr. lanoush's
previous statements to him, and that it was not a disinterested party because it initiated and
prosecuted the formal Complaint. (Petitioner's Brief, pp. 36-37.) This is the first time he makes these
specific allegations.
As discussed in Section B, the record must reflect an adverse ruling on that issue to be
considered on appeal. Whitted, 137 Idaho at 122. Although the legal theory was raised below, the
facts and ideas upon which Williams supports his argument are entirely disparate; the heading is the
same, but the substance is different. Consequentl y, Williams never raised this particular issue below,
and the Record does not reflect an adverse ruling on whether the Board abused its discretion on these
bases. Therefore, the issue is precluded from review.
However, notwithstanding the different basis before it, the District Court's reasoning was
sound in finding that the Board did not abuse its discretion in determining the appropriate sanctions
based on Williams' violations. As noted by the District Court, the decision regarding the imposition
of disciplinary administrative sanction is within an agency's discretion. BaH) v. Idaho State Bd. of
Med., 143 Idaho 51, 54 (2006).

Williams has not demonstrated that the Board was arbitrary, capricious, or abused its
discretion in determining which sanctions were appropriate given the nature of Williams ' violations.
First, he focuses on the facial quantity of violations rather than the substantive gravity of the
violations. The Board determined, and the District Court agreed, that "Williams was found to have
repeatedly accessed an appraisal web site using other persons' account information without their
permission, certified that he had personally inspected properties that he had not actually personally
inspected, and failed to provide relevant and accurate information concerning the sewer service
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availability in reference to a multi-million dollar multi-use development property sale. Upon these
facts the Board could reasonably conclude that it was not in the public's interest to allow Williams
to continue to licensed as a real estate appraiser." (R., pp. 593-594 )(citing to the Board's Final Order,
R. Agency, Vol. 11., Tab No. 96, pp. 2-3.)
Second, although Mr. lanoush made comments to Mr. Williams regarding his desire to see
Williams' license revoked, Williams' has failed to demonstrate how lanoush tainted the Hearing
Officer or the Board, as discussed above.
Lastly, Williams alleges that the Board abused its discretion because it could not be a
disinterested party based on the fact that it procedurally filed the formal Complaint to initiate the
contested case and referred the case to the Deputy Attorney General for resolution. Specifically, he
states that "the Board was no doubt swayed by its own allegations, regardless of having prevailed
upon the same." (Petitioner's Brief, p. 37.) However, the findings regarding the Board's allegations
were established by an impartial hearing officer. Further, the findings and conclusions ofthe hearing
officer were adopted in their entirety. (R. Agency, Vol. II, Tab No. 96, p. 1.) If the Board was truly
swayed by "its own" allegations in the Complaint, the Board could have rejected the Hearing
Officer's findings, many of which, as Williams emphasizes, were in his favor: the Board did not do
so.
Ultimately, Williams does not offer any evidence other than these three accusations to
demonstrate that the Board's consideration of the appropriate sanctions for the established violations
was biased or outside of the bounds of its discretion. Accordingly, this Court should uphold the
Board's Final Order because it was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of the Board's discretion.
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I.

The Board's Authority to Recover Costs and Fees is Sufficient to Allow for the
Recovery of the Attorney Fees it Incurred in the Investigation and Prosecution of
Williams' Violations of its Laws and Rules.
The Board cross-appeals the sole issue regarding the Board's statutory authority to recover

the attorney fees it incurred in the investigation and prosecution of the violations of the Board's law
and rules. The Board's Final Order stated, "[t]hat pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 54-[4107] and 672609(a)(6) and (7), and IDAPA 24.18.01.525, the Board possesses the authority to impose the
following disciplinary sanctions upon Respondent Timothy Williams ... [Williams] shall pay to the
Board the costs and attorney's fees incurred by the Board in the investigation and prosecution of
Respondent regarding the four violations of the Board's laws and rules as set forth [in the Final
Order]." (R. Agency, Vol. II, Tab No. 96, pp. 2-3.) Subsequently, the Board entered its Memorandum
Decision and Order on Costs and Fees, in which the Board assessed Williams $34,131.17 of the fees
and costs incurred in the investigation and prosecution of his violations of the Board's laws and
rules. (R. Agency Cert., Second Supplement to Agency Record on Appeal, Attachment H.)

1.

The Board's Decision to Award Attorney Fees Has a Solid Foundation in the Rules
and Statutes Governing the Board.

Pursuant to

I.e.

§ 67-2609(a)(6), the Board promulgated rule IDAPA 24.18.01.525.02,

which states the Board may "order a licensed or certified real estate appraiser to pay the costs and
fees incurred by the Board in the investigation and prosecution of a licensee for violation [of its laws
and rules]." The core of the issue on cross-appeal is whether the Board's express authorization in
statute and rule to recover "fees" refers to all types of fees.

In the action below, Williams "[did] not challenge the authority of the Board to investigate
and prosecute violations of the Act and to recover costs and fees incurred in the investigation and
prosecution of a licensee" (R., p. 529); however, he disputed that the term "fees" in
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I.e.

§ 67-

2609(a)(6) and IDAPA 24.18.01.525.02 includes attorney fees. His argument was that the term
included the recovery of some subsets of fees such as witness fees (R., p. 529) but that it excluded
the recovery of the subset of attorney fees. However, there is no indication that the Legislature meant
to specifically exclude attorney fees from the types of fees that the Board could recover.
There is no reason, given the nature of the Board's work and the framework of a licensing
board's investigation and prosecution of disciplinary actions, that its statutory authority to recover
fees excludes one type of fee-attorney fees-but includes other types of fees, such as court reporter
fees, hearing officer fees, witness fees; all of these fees were expended for the same purpose. See

Idaho Power Co. v. Idaho Public Utilities Commission, lO2 Idaho 744, 751-752 (1981) (noting that
the "statutory framework designed for the peculiar needs and circumstances" of an agency action is
relevant to consideration of whether statutory authority allows for an award of attorney fees).
Attorney fees are plainly a common and necessary type of fees that are associated with the
investigation and prosecution of licensees' violations of a board's law and rules.
Furthermore, Idaho statutes dealing with awards of attorney fees do not uniformly draw a
blunt distinction between attorney fees and other types of fees. For example, LC. § 7- 1028 (part of
the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act), is entitled "Costs and Fees," and allows for the payment
of several types of fees, including filing fees and attorney fees. Additionally, several Idaho statutes
state that attorney fees are to be taxed as costs, which under the Board's statutes and rules are also
authorized here. See, e.g., I.e. §§ 7-lO28(2); 54-1929; 7-718 (as interpreted by Ada Co. Highway

Dist., By and Through Fairbanks v. Acarrequi, lO5 Idaho 873 (1983»; I.e. § 52-411 (holding that
"attorney fees [] shall be recoverable by plaintiff as part of his costs of the lawsuit"); and] 5-8-208
("[e]ither the district court or the court on appeal may, in its discretion, order costs, including
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reasonable attorney fees, to be awarded"). Although, some statutes for governing other agencies in
Idaho may have language specifically naming attorney fees as authorized in disciplinary proceedings,
this does not take away the ability of this Board to do so. To so hold would be inconsistent with
numerous state statutes identified above.
Moreover, IDAPA 04.11.0l.741, Orders Regarding Costs and/or Fees (Rule 741) is
instructive here. This IDAPA section, governing the procedures of the Office of the Attorney
General, is adopted per se by the Board here through IDAPA 04.11.01.001.02 ("every state agency
will be considered to have adopted the procedural rules of this chapter unless the state agency by rule
affirmatively declines to adopt this chapter, in whole or in part"); see also IDAPA 23.20.01.003
(Idaho Bureau of Occupational Licenses procedural rules, adopting Attorney General procedural
rules), and IDAPA 24.18.01.650 (Real Estate Appraiser Board adopting procedural rules of the Idaho
Bureau of Occupational Licenses). IDAPA 04.11.0 l.741.0 1 specifically states: "This rule provides
procedures for considering requests for costs and/or fees (including attorney fees) when an agency
has authority to award costs and/or fees under other provisions of law." As such, the very procedural
rules that govern the Board state that a provision of law that grants an administrative agency the
authority to award costs and fees includes a right to award attorney fees.
The District Court erred in determining that the Board's statutory authorization to recover
fees was insufficient to award attorney fees. It referenced Willimns v. State for the proposition that
the term fees was inadequate to provide due process notice that attorney fees are a type of fee that
may be assessed. (R., p. 594.) However, Williams is inapposite because in that case the Court of
Appeals found that a statute was not void for vagueness because when construed with other statutes
related to Commercial Driver's Licenses (CDL), the statute provided sufficient notice that an
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individual's CDL was subject to revocation for violation of a criminal statute. 153 Idaho 380, 238
P.3d 127, 136-137 (Ct. App. 2012). This was not a case where the court found that a broader
statutory term was found to exclude a subset within the term.
Additionally, Williams actually supports the position, noted above, that when taking together
all the statutes and rules that apply to the licensing of real estate appraisers, including I.C § 672609(a)(6), IDAPA 24.18.01.525.02, IDAPA 23.20.01.003, IDAPA 24.18.01.650, and IDAPA
04.11.01. 741.01, a licensee has notice that the Board has the authority to recover fees and that the
term specifically contemplates the inclusion of attorney fees. See id. at 137. Hence, a licensee has
notice that attorney fees are recoverable.
The District Court also looked to Idaho PO'vver, quoting, in part, "that attorney fees may be
awarded only where specifically provided in statute or contract." (R., p. 595.) However, in that case
this court was applying a "general rule" to a situation where the Public Utilities Commission
imposed attorney fees solely based on its broad grants of authority to "supervise and regulate" public
utilities and to adopt rules or practice and procedure for its hearings. Idaho Power, 102 Idaho at 750.
The Commission's statutes and rules nowhere mentioned the awarding of fees. Id. Lastly, the
District Court drew from State v. Rae emphasizing the Court of Appeal's use of the word "explicit"
in its holding that attorney fees must stem from a statutory basis. 139 Idaho 650, 656 (Ct. App.
2004). There, a criminal defendant had not directed the court to any statutory basis for an award of
costs or attorney fees. Id.
Ultimately, the cases used for support by the District Court are all cases in which there was
no statutory authority for any award of any kinds of fees. However, in this case the statutes and rules
governing the Board specifically authorize the Board to recover its fees. Thus, in the present case,
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there is a solid foundation for the recovery of all types of fees, including attorney fees. In short, the
plain language of the statutes and rules and statutory framework of the administrative licensing
disciplinary proceedings demonstrate that the term fees is inclusive of all fees incurred in the
investigation and prosecution of a licensee's violations of the Board's laws and rules.

2.

The Board's Determination of the Costs and Fees Ordered Was Not an Abuse
of Discretion.

In the present case, the Board used the guiding principles of the case Haw v. Idaho State
Board of Medicine, 143 Idaho 5] (2006) in determining how to award fees and costs in this case.

In Haw, the Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the Board of Medicine's award of attorney fees against
a licensee in a disciplinary case. The Board in that case had granted itself a full attorney fee award
despite the fact that very few of the original charges against the licensee had ultimately been found
to be valid, declining the licensee's request to apportion the attorney fee award based on the number
of charges found to be valid. On judicial review, the district court vacated this award, finding that
although "the numerical count of claims won or lost was not dispositive, [it] concluded the record
clearly showed the Board prevailed in part and lost in part. As the hoard engaged in no analysis
regarding the relative significance of the claims won or lost, the District Court concluded the board
failed to establish its entitlement to costs and attorney fees." 143 Idaho at 53.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, that court determined that an administrative board "must
engage in a meaningful analysis of the charges made in relation to the charges upon which the board
was successful. While the board need not add up the allegations and calculate with mathematical
precision who won the most claims, there should be some analysis of precisely how much time and
effort went into proving the misconduct that resulted in discipline." 143 Idaho at 54. The Idaho
Supreme Court then directed that "the Board should consider how many of the claims the doctor
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prevailed on, the overall success in supporting the Board's allegations and the amount of time and
effort devoted to proving the claimed misconduct for which discipline was imposed, as opposed to
the total time spent in pursuing all of the allegations." Id.
In the present case, the Board did just as the Haw court directed. It did not award itself a total

amount of fees and costs. Rather, it conducted a meaningful analysis of those claims upon which the
Board prevailed and those upon which Williams prevailed. Pages 7-11 of the Board's Memorandum
Decision Order on Costs and Fees are dedicated to the Board's analysis of these very issues. (R.
Agency Cert., Second Supplement, Attachment H.) The Board plainly looked at the total number of

counts initially brought against Williams and how those counts ultimately stood. Further, the Board
derived specific formulas for dealing with each count in considering the number of claims the Board
had prevailed on within that count. Id. at 9. More so, the Board's analysis of these factors extended
not just to attorney fees, but to specific costs as well, including the nature of individual costs and
how they applied specifically to the counts brought against Williams. Id. at 9-10.
Importantly, in reaching its decision on attorney fees and costs, the Board considered the fact
that it had imposed significant discipline upon Mr. Williams-revocation of his license-due to the
serious nature of the claims upon which the Board had prevailed. The Board specifically found
deliberate and substantial misrepresentations and dishonesty by Williams in Count I that alone
justified revocation of his license. See id., p. 8. This fact by itself is significant given Haw's directive
that "the sanction bear[] a reasonable relationship to the conduct warranting discipline." 143 Idaho
at 55 (compare to the facts in Haw, in which the board's numerous allegations of misconduct were
largely insignificant, such as illegible handwriting, incomplete and stereotypical charting, etc.).
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The Board has complied with the directions in Haw and the apportionment of fees and costs
is not an abuse of discretion. 2 Here, the Board perceived that its decision with respect to fees and
costs was discretionary (see R. Agency Cert., Second Supplement, Attachment H, p. 4)
(acknowledging that the Board's decision was being made pursuant to its discretionary authority).
The Board acted within the outer limits of its discretion and consistent with legal standards
applicable to the available choices, as demonstrated above. And, the Board undertook an exercise
ofreason in reaching its decision, as evidenced by the analysis in the Memorandum Decision itself.
Thus, this Court should uphold the Memorandum Decision and Order on Costs and Fees. Finally,
the Board, as Cross-Appellant, pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 35(c) reserves it right to file a reply
brief to Williams' cross-respondent brief on this issue.

V.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, this Court should affirm the District Court's decision and
uphold the Final Order as to all issues on direct appeal and should reverse the District Court's
decision regarding the Board's recovery of its attorney fees on cross-appeal. Appellant has failed to
set forth any meritorious argument as to why the Board's Final Order was in error or should be
reversed. Also, the Memorandum and Decision Order on Costs and Fees should be upheld because

2

The Haw court established:

While this Court has been confronted with the question of whether a certain agency
action constitutes an abuse of discretion, we have not expressly articulated the
standard to be applied when making that determination. We now clarify that an
appellate court reviewing agency actions under the APA must determine whether the
agency perceived the issue in question as discretionary, acted within the outer limits
of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the available
choices, and reached its own decision through an exercise of reason. 143 Idaho at 54.
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the Board had the authority to recover its fees and did not abuse its discretion in determining the
award. Further, this Court should award the Respondent-Cross-Appellant Board its attorney fees and
costs on appeal under I.e. § 12-117 where the Appellant's arguments have no valid basis in law or
fact, in whole or in part.
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